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Abstract
IEC 61131-3, the world-wide standard for industrial control programming, is increasingly
being used in embedded control applications. The standard supports the concept of reusable
“software ICs” through the concept of function blocks. can be hierarchically grouped and
horizontally “wired” to Complex control loops are typically built from elementary compo-
nents taken from domain-specific libraries. Code inspection and testing are the two pre-
dominant quality assurance techniques in practice, today. For highly dependable control
applications, however, these techniques are not sufficient, in general.
This paper suggests to augment testing with compositional, theorem-prover supported
verification. The approach is based on a representation of IEC 61131-3 function blocks in
higher-order logic. The verification task is separated into the a priori verification of library
components and a separate proof of individual application programs. The latter relies on
proven properties of the library components used. We sketch the semantic embedding of
three most used languages of the IEC standard and illustrate our verification approach with
a simple example. We conclude with a wish list for a verification tool that is usable by
application and licensing engineers.
Key words: Safety-critical control systems, dependable software, PLC
programming, IEC 61131-3, modular verification, higher order logic
theorem proving.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) form a growing market of special purpose
hybrid systems integrating micro-electronic and software components. PLCs are
particularly suited to solve application problems in machine logic, process automa-
tion, manufacturing, and data acquisition. They were developed to replace tradi-
tional hard-wired switching networks based on relay or discrete electronic logic.
The rapid development of PLC systems in the eighties led to a wealth of incom-
patible vendor-specific PLC programming languages within the process industries
impeding the design of more complex, open and distributed control applications. In
response to this situation, the international standard IEC 61131-3 for PLC program-
ming [16] was developed. The standard applies to a wide range of programmable
controllers and harmonizes the way engineers look at industrial control by stan-
dardizing the programming interface.
The standard provides a class of five purpose-built languages that overlap con-
ceptually and share a subset of programming elements [20]. Three languages of
the standard, Function Block Diagram (FBD), Ladder Diagram (LD) and Sequen-
tial Function Chart (SFC) have a graphical appearance. FBD supports component-
based application programming, while SFC is mainly used for describing the dy-
namic behavior of a control system including alternative and parallel execution
sequences.
New capabilities of PLCs, the comfort of the PLC languages, and strong eco-
nomical demands led to the current situation that we are increasingly depending on
PLC-based systems for control and automation functions in safety-related applica-
tions. Examples include (air) traffic control, patient monitoring, process automa-
tion, e.g, in chemical industry, emergency shut down systems in power generation,
and production line control.
The growing social awareness of the need to protect the environment, a higher
sensitivity to accidents caused by ill-designed technology or processes, and a de-
clining confidence in marketing statements of manufacturers lead to an enormous
pressure to increase the dependability of safety related applications. In practice,
however, there is a lack of rigorous proof techniques and robust tools that can be
used effectively by practitioners in industry and regulatory authorities. Existing
design guidelines and testing practices may help to detect design and programming
errors but they cannot guarantee the absence of faults that may cause a disaster
because exhaustive testing limited to rare cases.
The main body of this paper explores function blocks – which represent the
engineer’s idea of re-usable ”software ICs” – and sequential function charts for their
potential to develop a modular, theorem prover-based verification framework. By
taking components from application-specific libraries of verified standard function
blocks, the verification of new applications is reduced considerably because only
the correctness of the composition has to be established for each new application.
2
In the following section, the core concepts of FBD and SFC are introduced. In
Section 3, the underlying higher order logic is discussed. The verification approach
is based on a semantic embedding of the selected PLC languages in that logic.
This embedding is explained in Section 4, while the verification process and the
challenges of handling complex continuous systems are sketched in Section 5 and
6, respectively. The paper concludes with a brief summary and an outlook on an
industrial strength verification tool, which can ultimately be used by domain experts
with little or no expertise in software verification.
2 Function Blocks and Sequential Function Charts
Function blocks are program organization units with a private state that persists
from one invocation to the next. A function block interacts with its environment
primarily via input and output variables. The IEC standard also allows global vari-
ables but our verification framework does not support these. Besides keeping the
semantics simple, this also has the advantage that the execution of function blocks
has no side-effects.
From a semantic point of view, function blocks are a special case of determin-
istic reactive modules [2]. According to the model of reactive systems [11], their
execution takes place in a sequence of rounds. At the start of each round, the input
variables are read. This is followed by an update of the private and output variables.
This update is functionally dependent on the current value of the input variables and
the previous state of the private and and output variables.
The description of a function block can be split into the declaration of its ex-
ternal interface and a specification of the internal implementation. The former is
part of the function block signature that specifies the types and names of variables
including local instances of function blocks. In the context of graphical representa-
tions, the input and output variables will also be referred to as ports. The interface
specification is similar to the description of interfaces in other languages such as
CORBA-IDL [26]. The internal implementation of a function block body can be
carried out in any of the five IEC 61131-3 programming languages or even in other
languages such as C or Java.
As an example, Figure 1(a) shows a graphical representation of the external in-
terface of the function block DEBOUNCE taken from the IEC 61131-3. DEBOUNCE
has two input variables IN and DB TIME of type BOOL and TIME and two output
variables OUT and ET OFF of the same types.
An implementation of DEBOUNCE as a function block diagram is depicted in
Figure 1(b). The function blocks DB ON and DB OFF are two separate instances
of the timer function block TON, while DB FF is an instance of the SR flip-flop,
which is included in the standard, too. By connecting input and output ports, a dia-
gram is “wired together” from the components [10]. As in the graphical representa-
tion of circuits, at the open circle such as at the input port IN of DB OFF indicates
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Fig. 1. Function block DEBOUNCE
the negation of a Boolean signal. The named instances of function blocks will usu-
ally also be referred to simply as function blocks. The function block DEBOUNCE
is composed from standard function blocks predefined in the norm. Such a com-
posite function block can itself be used in further applications just as if it was one
of the standard function blocks. This feature is useful for building an in-house or
domain specific collection of function blocks.
The textual IEC 61131-3 language ST is similar in appearance to a structured
programming language such as PASCAL. Figure 2 shows an alternative implemen-
tation of the body of DEBOUNCE in ST.
DB ON  IN  IN  PT  DB TIME
DB OFF  IN  NOT IN  PT  DB TIME
DB FF  S  DB ONQ  R  DB OFFQ
OUT  DB FFQ
ET OFF  DB OFFET
Fig. 2. DEBOUNCE in Structured Text
The second graphical language of the standard, SFC, can be regarded as an
application of Petri nets. Its language concepts include transitions, steps and ac-
tions. They serve to co-ordinate the execution of function blocks that are regarded
as asynchronous sequential processes.
To illustrate the role of SFC, we refer to a small laboratory plant that has been
used previously as a benchmark for non-linear control design methods [15] and
for the tool-aided analysis of discretely controlled continuous systems [17]. The
plant features two cylindric tanks that are located at different levels. The tanks are
equipped with three pipes and three valves controlling the flow of liquid between
the tanks, at the inlet and at the outlet (see Fig. 2). The pipes are controlled by
valves  
 
,  

and  

. The liquid level in the second tank is measured by a sensor L.
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A core safety requirement for this application is to avoid overflow in the coupled
tank system.
V2
V0
2h
LV1
Fig. 3. Laboratory plant
The SFC depicted in Fig 2 controls the behavior of the system. It consists
of five steps s0, .., s4. The actions connected with the steps control the state of the
valves: the qualifiers  and denote setting and resetting of an action, respectively.
The transitions separating the steps are enabled by Boolean valued expressions that
reflect conditions on the state of the associated function block.
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Level <= L
Step_2.T >= T
Step_1.T >= T
Start
Level >= L
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-
+
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2
Fig. 4. SFC controller for laboratory plant
The encapsulation provided by function blocks together with their openness
with respect to the internal implementation furthers the reuse of function blocks
in different applications. Hence, it makes sense to develop component libraries.
Examples include the collection of standard function blocks of the IEC 61131-3,
the German standard norm [33], and the domain specific library of function blocks
used by a German manufacturer of chemicals and drugs we have studied earlier[10].
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This in-house library consists of about 70 function blocks that are sufficient to
specify/program chemical process automation tasks.
3 Higher Order Logic for Verification
The logic underlying our verification approach is higher order logic [4,9]. There
are several good reasons for this choice:
(i) The means of abstraction and quantification over functions make this logic
very expressive and thus well suited to the concise description of complex
theories. Evidence of this fact is provided by the embedding of hardware
description languages [6] and the verification of floating point algorithms [14].
(ii) HOL is a widely studied and well understood logical system with a remark-
ably small number of axioms and inference rules. Its expressiveness makes
it possible to use definitional extension as the principal method of theory de-
velopment. Since this method is conservative, logical inconsistencies can be
practically ruled out.
(iii) Automatic type inference systems for HOL make type annotations to a great
extend unnecessary. This shortens formulas and proofs because the informa-
tion contained in the typing is automatically inferred and propagated.
In comparison to alternatives such as Zermelo-Fra¨nkel set theory, there are also a
few disadvantages:
(i) The strict type discipline of HOL leads to a certain loss of expressiveness
(cf. [19]). This statement is true despite the provision of polymorphism and
symbol overloading, which are available in systems such as Isabelle/HOL.
(ii) In comparison with first and second order logics, the implementation of the
HOL type system is technically more demanding. In particular, the existence
of type and function variables complicates unification, the basic method of
equation solving [24]. Also, most research in automated theorem proving has
been performed in the area of first order theories.
For the purpose of implementing an integrated verification framework, the advan-
tages of HOL outweigh these drawbacks. Its extendibility makes it unnecessary to
introduce special logics for the definition of the semantics of programs and spec-
ifications. Instead, HOL provides a logical core that can serve as the common
semantical basis for a range of different formalisms.
Furthermore, it is important that the logic is supported by several reliable and
efficient mechanical theorem proving assistants. Our system of choice is the object
logic HOL of the generic theorem proving assistant Isabelle [28]. Like the HOL
system [9], Isabelle builds on the functional programming language SML [22].
Noteworthy alternatives include the HOL system and the LISP based PVS system
[30] .
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With regard to verification, the high degree of safety and reliability of a proof
assistant are of paramount importance. In the Isabelle system, a number of mea-
sures are taken in order to achieve this aim:
(i) Theorems are elements of a special abstract SML data type thm. New ele-
ments of this type can only be formed by a small number of operations rep-
resenting valid logical deductions or explicit axioms. If one assumes that the
Isabelle implementation of these basic operations is correct, then the static
type checking of SML guarantees also the logical validity of all derivations.
(ii) The preferred method for extending theories is definitional. This minimizes
the danger of logical inconsistencies.
(iii) Isabelle is an open and extendible system with a freely available source code.
The source code is well structured and written in a functional programming
language with only little use of imperative features. This makes it open to be
scrutinized by independent researchers.
Furthermore, Isabelle has a comprehensive international user community. These
combined factors have given Isabelle - like the HOL system - the reputation of an
extremely trustworthy proof support system.
In addition to safety, a high degree of proof automation is essential in order to
cope in a reasonable time with the many proof obligations arising during verifica-
tion. The main tools of the Isabelle systems in this respect are a term-rewriting
simplifier and a proof search tool called the classical reasoner. External decision
procedures can be invoked from Isabelle using an oracle mechanism. The degree of
automation is sufficient for the definition of formal semantics and the verification
of small to medium-sized function block applications.
4 Embedding Function Blocks in HOL
The main motivation behind the formulation of higher order logic as used in the
HOL system was the mechanical verification of hardware. Remarkable achieve-
ments in this area include the verification of an ATM network component [8] and
of RISC pipeline conflicts [32]. In comparison, success of HOL in the area of soft-
ware verification has been more tedious. Research has concentrated up-to now on
particular aspects of real programming languages such as the type safety of a Java
subset [25].
The foundation of our verification framework is a HOL embedding of a sub-
set of Structured Text (ST). The technical details of this embedding can be found
in [34]. It is a relatively deep embedding, which means that the syntax of function
blocks and the assignment of semantics are represented explicitly in HOL. Seman-
tics are defined via evaluation functions for the four different syntactical categories,
namely expressions, statements, functions and function blocks. As a result, every
function block is associated with a deterministic, but not necessarily finite Mealy
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automaton in HOL.
Time is treated as an input variable. Like all other input variables, its value
stays constant in each round. This agrees with the 0-delay paradigm underlying the
synchronous programming languages such as Esterel or Lustre [5]. A difference is
that function blocks are strictly hierarchical and have a sequential semantics. As
a consequence, the issue of instantaneous feedback does not arise. Furthermore,
because verification is based predominantly on theorem proving and not on model
checking, the efficient compilation of function blocks to finite automata is of less
importance than is the case for synchronous programming languages.
The HOL terms that describe the semantics of function blocks are initially clut-
tered with occurrences of the evaluation functions. In a term rewriting process
which resembles a symbolic evaluation, these occurrences can be eliminated. This
process can be largely automated. It yields HOL terms that resemble simulations
of ST function blocks viewed as functional programs. In this form, the automata
are suitable for verification.
An important aspects of our semantics is compositionality. This means that the
transition function of the automaton belonging to a composed block is a composi-
tion of the transition functions of the automata belonging to the components. Thus
proven properties of the components can be reused. Furthermore, by abstracting
over component properties, it is possible to prove properties of composed function
blocks without reference to the concrete implementation of the components.
In addition to ST, the verification framework also deals with subsets of the two
graphical IEC 61131-3 languages SFC and FBD. This is based on interpretations
of these two formalisms in ST. The result is in both cases a formal semantics that
is sequential and deterministic. We will sketch the interpretation of function block
diagrams below. For SFC, we refer to [34].
4.1 Interpretation of Function Block Diagrams in ST
The connection of function block inputs with outputs in a diagram induces a de-
pendency relation on its components: a function block  depends on a function
block  provided at least one input port of  is connected directly or indirectly
to some output port of . The relation is a partial order as long as the diagram
does not contain feedback loops. In the latter case, we require the user to spec-
ify feedback variables for connections. This has the effect of a unit delay on the
connections involved, i.e., the input port always receives the output value from the
previous round. In the definition of the dependency relation for function block di-
agrams with feedback variables, such delayed connections are disregarded. This
eliminates cycles and ensures that the dependency relation is a partial ordering.
The essential step in the interpretation of a function block diagram in ST is
a sequentialization of the function block executions per round. The only require-
ment placed on this sequentialization is its compatibility with the dependency or-
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dering. This rule does not specify the relative execution order of independent func-
tion blocks. For example, in the function block DEBOUNCE, both DB ON and
DB OFF have to be executed before DB FF, but nothing is said about their relative
execution order. Since we disallow global variables in our verification framework,
this under-specification does not lead to non-determinism; in addition, the resulting
semantics of a function block is not affected by the choice of execution sequence
as long as it is compatible with the dependency ordering.
5 The Verification Approach
The deep embedding of PLC programming languages in HOL provides a formal se-
mantics. Furthermore, the semantics given above are operational. Function blocks
can thus be evaluated symbolically using a term rewriting tool. Requirements on
the behavior of function blocks can be translated to HOL predicates and proven
formally. Figure 5 shows the verification process for SFC function blocks using
linear time temporal logic (LTL, [21]) as specification language.
Isabelle/HOL
SFC function blocks Requirements as LTL formulas
Automata /
stream functions
HOL predicates on
states and streams
Proof goals
Proof tactics
Decision procedures
Theorems
External tools:
model checkers,
simulators, ...
Fig. 5. Function Block Verification Process
Real-time constraints on the controller behavior are reflected firstly by LTL for-
mulas which depend on the time input variable and secondly by upper bounds on
the controller response time and the time difference between two controller invo-
cations. Conformance of an implementation to the latter two kind of time bounds
is not proven formally but instead established separately using implementation-
dependent timing information.
One of the strong points of the HOL based approach is its openness with re-
spect to possible extensions. An addition of further programming or specification
language constructs is unproblematic as long as it does not affect the underlying
semantical model of the already embedded language parts. The same remark holds
9
for the modeling of machine or environment aspects, which might be necessary for
the verification of more complex systems. To put it more generally: HOL serves as
logical glue that connects different programming and specification formalism and
allows their integration and analysis within one framework.
It might be interesting to investigate the integration of the Step system devel-
oped by Zohar Manna’s group in Stanford with the framework used here. Espe-
cially their combination of model checking and theorem proving might be advan-
tageous for the application domain considered in this contribution.
In relatively small examples such as the verification of a liquid container con-
troller presented in [18], the standard Isabelle/HOL proof tools are sufficient. Be-
cause specifications are mapped to predicates on streams, the basic proof principle
is induction over the natural numbers. In the induction step, the validity of a state-
ment in round     has to be derived from its validity in round . Induction
is also essential for the proof of auxiliary algebraic equalities and inequalities and
the verification of iterated structures such as a generic adder. Other frequent proof
techniques are case distinctions, algebraic simplifications and arithmetic estima-
tions. Isabelle’s classical reasoner has been very useful for the automation of these
kinds of proofs.
The main focus of the work described above is the correctness of controller
implementations with respect to requirements formalized in LTL/HOL. For more
complex applications, the formulation and formalization of the controller require-
ments can itself be a non-trivial task. This suggests an extension of the verification
approach so as to model in HOL the whole control loop composed of controller and
plant. This could be based on HOL models of plants as non-deterministic timed au-
tomata [1].
For more larger applications, a higher degree of proof automation is essen-
tial. This starts off with the automated translation of function blocks into Isabelle
theories. Tactics specially adapted to programming or specification language con-
structs should be tried automatically or offered interactively to the user for selection
and parameterization. Relevant automated proof procedures include the symbolic
model checking of finite systems [3] and algorithms for establishing program in-
variants [31,12].
The main focus of the work described above is the correctness of controller
implementations with respect to requirements formalized in LTL/HOL. For more
complex applications, the formulation and formalization of the controller require-
ments can itself be a non-trivial task. This suggests an extension of the verification
approach so as to model in HOL the whole control loop composed of controller and
plant. This could be based on HOL models of plants as non-deterministic timed au-
tomata [1].
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6 The Challenge of Complex Dynamics
Up-to now, the use of theorem prover based tools has been restricted to the verifi-
cation of systems with relatively simple continuous dynamics. This is partly due
to the fact that the treatment of such systems would require extensive real/complex
analysis libraries. As the pioneering work in [13] shows, this is a comprehensive
task. Even with such libraries, a complete analytic verification of systems such as
the two tank laboratory plant sketched in Fig. 4 seems a daunting task.
Besides providing formal models of controllers and abstractions of plant prop-
erties, one useful role for deductive proof tools in this area might be the validation
of interpolation and extrapolation properties. These guarantee that nothing unex-
pected happens for parameter combinations that have not been explicitly covered
during simulation or model checking. This validates intuitive worst-case reasoning
and increases the trustworthiness of verification results.
7 Towards an Industrial Strength Tool
The main body of this paper presented a theorem prover based verification tech-
nique that supports modular proofs of PLC programs expressed in FBD, SFC and
ST. In general, the development of such proofs with the help of theorem prover as-
sistants requires high skills from the quality assurance personnel because the proof
assistant relies on sophisticated user guidance. These skills cannot be expected
from engineers in the field.
Conversely, people with skills in formal specification and verification tech-
niques normally lack the domain expertise needed to understand functional and
safety requirements that are often not made explicit and, if so, are usually presented
in an incomplete, ambiguous and informal manner. In the course of our work with
the IEC standard, its German counterpart, and the in-house standard and function
block library of a manufacturer in chemical industry we spent days and weeks in
reading through these documents and many hours talking to domain experts to fully
understand the requirements.
Hence, to make the verification approach we presented work in automation
practice, we need to find effective means to solve the following three tasks:
(i) Comprehensive elicitation of functional, safety, and – if appropriate – timing
requirements.
(ii) Formalization of these requirements in a suitable logic.
(iii) Correctness proof.
As the set of standard function blocks that are typically used in specific control
domains ranges between 50 and a few hundreds and the complexity of the majority
of function blocks maintained in the domain library is relatively low, the effort to
have these tasks performed by computer theoreticians is acceptable. It needs to be
11
summoned up only once.
However, for handling individual control applications that are composed of net-
works of function blocks, we need to wrap an open verification environment with a
front-end that is usable by domain experts. This verification environment may build
on a theorem prover as its backbone and comprise other tools such as model check-
ers, simulators or computer algebra systems. The interface to the front-end must
be capable to elicit enough facts about critical application requirements through a
series of communication interactions with domain experts such that formal require-
ment statements can be derived. Such dialogs need to know about the terminology
of the field, they may rely on a collection of known requirements typical for that
domain, and they may exploit proven properties of function blocks connected to
the application interface and the inner wiring of the application program to conduct
that dialog. It may also exploit paraphrasing capabilities to verify the adequacy of
formalized requirement statements acquired in earlier communications. The work
on knowledge intensive software engineering tools conducted by Rich and Waters
(cf., e.g. [29]) might provide prototype solutions for the engineering environment
sketched here. In a related project in South Africa, we have also used Parnas’ table
specification technique [27] to formalize standard function block interfaces [23] in
a way that might be more readable to engineers.
To facilitate the verification task, it is very important to find proof patterns
and reusable proof strategies to automate recurring verification steps. In this re-
spect, the integration of automatic model checking procedures such as pioneered
by N. Shankar for the PVS system seems particularly promising.
To come up with usable solutions, a close co-operation with interested vendors,
users and evaluators for PLC controllers in safety critical fields is urgently needed.
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